The notion of system complexity is much like S t . Augustine's description of time: "What t h e n is time [complexity] ? If no one a s k s me. I know; if I wish t o explain it t o one t h a t a s k s , I know not." T h e r e seem t o b e fairly well-developed, intuitive ideas about what constitutes a complex system, b u t a t t e m p t s t o axiomatize and formalize this s e m e of t h e complex all leave a vague, uneasy feeling of basic incompleteness, and a s e n s e of failure to grasp important a s p e c t s of t h e essential n a t u r e of t h e problem. In this c h a p t e r w e examine some of t h e root causes of t h e s e failures and outline a framework f o r t h e consideration of complexi t y t h a t provides a s t a r t i n g point f o r t h e development of operational p r o c e d u r e s in t h e identification, characterization, and management of complex processes. In t h e process of developing t h i s framework f o r speculation, i t is necessary t o cons i d e r a variety of system-theoretic concepts closely allied t o t h e notion of complexity: hierarchies, adaptation. bifurcation, self -organization, and reductionism, t o name b u t a few. The p i c t u r e t h a t emerges is t h a t of complexity as a l a t e n t o r i m p l i c a t e p r o p e r t y of a system. a p r o p e r t y made explicit only through t h e interaction of t h e given system with another. Just a s in baseball where some pitches a r e balls and some a r e s t r i k e s , b u t "they a i n ' t nothin"' until t h e umpire calls them, complexity cannot b e thought of a s an intrinsic p r o p e r t y of an isolated (closed) system; i t is only made manifest b y t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e system with a n o t h e r , usually in t h e process of measurement and/or control. In this s e n s e , i t is '3otes and r e f e r e n c e s r e l e v a n t t o e a c h s e c t i o n a r e given at t h e end of t h e c h a p t e r .
probably more meaningful to consider complexity more as a p r o p e r t y of t h e i n t e raction than of t h e system, although i t is clearly associated with both. The exploration and exploitation of this observation provides t h e s t a r t i n g point f o r an emergent t h e o r y of complex processes.
Before embarking upon a detailed consideration of complexity in natural and human phenomena, i t is useful t o consider for a moment why a d e e p e r understanding of complexity, p e r s e , is of e i t h e r theoretical o r practical importance. The basic reason is t h e seemingly i n h e r e n t human need to simplify in o r d e r to unders t a n d a n d d i r e c t (control). Since most understanding and virtually all control is based upon a model (mental. mathematical, physical, o r otherwise) of t h e system under study, t h e simplification imperative translates into a d e s i r e t o obtain an equivalent, b u t reduced, representation of t h e original model of t h e system. This may involve omitting some of t h e original variables, aggregating o t h e r s , ignoring weak couplings, regarding slowly changing variables a s constants, a n d a variety of o t h e r subterfuges. All of t h e s e simplification techniques a r e aimed a t reducing t h e degrees of freedom t h a t t h e system has a t its disposal t o i n t e r a c t with i t s environment. A t h e o r y of system complexity would give us knowledge a s t o t h e limitations of t h e reduction process. For example, it is well known t h a t t h e three-body problem of celestial mechanics cannot b e resolved in analytic terms; however, t h e twobody problem is completely solvable, b u t a sequence of two-body problems cannot be combined t o solve t h e three-body problem. Thus, t h e complexity of t h e t h r e ebody problem is intrinsically g r e a t e r than any sequence of two-body problems and t h e r e is an irretrievable loss of information in passing t o such a reduced representation. A useful t h e o r y of system complexity would provide conditions u n d e r which such a decomposition would work and p e r h a p s even suggest novel, nonphysical, simpler representations t h a t would be valid when t h e "natural" simplif ications fail.
What a r e t h e distinguishing s t m c t u r d and behavioral c h a r z c t e r i s t i c s of those systems we intuitively think of as being complex? Perhaps t h e easiest way t o approach this question is t o consider i t s converse: what f e a t u r e s do w e associa t e with s i m p l e systems? Some of t h e most evident p r o p e r t i e s of simple systems a r e :
A'edictable b e h a v i o r . T h e r e a r e no surprises: simple systems exhibit a behavior p a t t e r n t h a t is easy to deduce from knowledge of t h e e x t e r n a l inputs (decisions) acting upon t h e system. If w e d r o p a stone, it falls; if w e s t r e t c h a spring and let i t go, it oscillates in a fixed p a t t e r n ; if w e p u t money into a fixed-interest bank account it grows t o a sum according to an easily understood and computable rule. Such predictable and intuitively wellunderstood behavior is c h a r a c t e r i s tic of simple systems.
Complex processes, on t h e o t h e r hand, display counter-intuitive, seemingly acausal behavior full of unpredictable surprises. Taxes a r e lowered and unemployment a n d stagflation persist; low-cost housing projects g e n e r a t e slums worse than those t h e housing replaced; construction of freeways results in unprecedented traffic jams and increased commuting times. For many people, such unpredictable and seemingly capricious behavior d e f i n e s a complex system. f i w i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d feedback/feedforward Loops. Simple systems generally involve a small number of components, with self-interaction dominating t h e mutual interaction of t h e variables. For instance, primitive b a r t e r economies involving only a small number of goods (food, tools, weapons, clothing) a r e generally much simpler and easier to understand than t h e developed economies of industrialized nations, in which t h e pathway between raw material inputs and finished consumer goods follows a byzantine route involving large numbers of interactions between various intermediate products, labor, and capital inputs.
Besides involving only a few variables, simple systems generally have very few feedback/feedforward loops. Such loops enable t h e system to res t r u c t u r e , o r a t least modify, t h e interaction p a t t e r n of its variables. thereby opening-up t h e possibility of a wider range of potential behavior patterns. A s an illustration, imagine a large organization characterized by t h e variables: employment stability, substitution of work by capital, and level of individuality (personal level). Increased substitution of work by capital decreases t h e human level in t h e organization, which in turn may decrease employment stability. Such a feedback loop exacerbates any initial internal stresses, potentially leading to a collapse of the process. This type of collapsing loop is especially dangerous for social resilience and is a common feature of complex social phenomena. Centralized decision-making. Power in simple systems is generally concent r a t e d in one o r , a t most, a f e w decision-makers. Political dictatorships, privately owned corporations, and t h e Roman Catholic Church a r e good examples of such systems. These systems a r e simple because t h e r e is very little interaction, if any a t all, between t h e lines of command. In addition, t h e effect of the central authority's decision upon t h e system is usually r a t h e r easy t o trace.
By contrast, complex systems display a diffusion of r e a l authority. There is generally a nominal, supreme decision-maker, where t h e buck stops, but in actuality t h e power is spread over a decentralized s t r u c t u r e , with t h e actions of a number of units combining to generate t h e system behavior. Typical examples include democratic governments, labor unions, and universities. Systems exhibiting distributed decision-making tend t o be somewhat more resilient and more stable than centralized s t r u c t u r e s , as they a r e more forgiving of mistakes by any one decision-maker and a r e more able to absorb unexpected environmental fluctuations. Decomposable. Typically, a simple system involves weak interactions among its constituent components. Consequently, if we sever some of these interactions t h e system behaves more-or-less as before. Relocating American Indians t o reservations produced no major effects on t h e dominznt social structure in Arizona, for example, since, for cultural reasons, the Indians were only weakly coupled t o t h e local social fabric. Thus, t h e simple social interaction p a t t e r n could be f u r t h e r decomposed and studied as two independent processes, t h e Indians and t h e settlers. A similar situation occurs for t h e restricted three-body problem, involving t h e Sun, Earth, and Moon. For some purposes, this system can be decomposed by neglecting t h e Moon and so studied as a simpler two-body problem.
On t h e o t h e r hand, a complex process is irreducible. Neglecting any p a r t of it o r severing any connection usually irretrievably destroys essential aspects of t h e system's behavior o r structure. W e have already mentioned t h e unrestricted three-body problem in this regard. Other examples include t h e t r i p a r t i t e division of t h e U S government into executive, judicial, and legislative subsystems, an RLC electrical circuit, and a Renoir painting.
The picture t h a t emerges from t h e foregoing considerations of simple systems is a notion of complex phenomena characterized by counter-intuitive behavioral modes t h a t a r e unpredictable from knowledge of environmental inputs; by relatively large numbers of variables interacting through a rich network of feedback/feedforward connections; by decentralized decision-making structures and a high level of functional indecomposability. Since such features a r e characteristic of many of t h e human systems of modern life, it is necessary to develop effective procedures for managing and planning t h e future course of such processes. Let us briefly consider some of t h e issues involved in obtaining a handle on complex systems.
Management of the Complex
Some problems a r e just too complicated f o r rational, logical solutions. They admit of insights, not answers.
J. Wiesner
We have already noted t h a t system complexity is a contingent property arising out of t h e interaction I between a system S and an observer/decision-maker 0 . Thus, any perception and measure of complexity is necessarily a function of S, 0 , and I. Conditioned by t h e physical sciences, w e typically regard S as t h e active system, with 0 being a passive observer o r disengaged controller. Such a picture misses the crucial point t h a t generally t h e system S can also be regarded as an observer of 0 and t h a t t h e interaction I is a two-way path. In o t h e r words. for a given mode of interaction I , t h e system S displays a certain level of complexity relative to 0 , while a t t h e same time 0 has a level of complexity relative to S. For t h e sake of definitiveness, let us denote t h e former as d e s i g n complexity and the l a t t e r as control complezity. It is our contention t h a t t h e behavior of S becomes uncontrollable when these two complexity levels a r e too f a r a p a r t ; hence t h e "golden rule" for management of complex systems is t o arrange matters so t h a t design complexity = control complexity.
The distinction between design and control complexity has been blurred in t h e natural sciences because of t h e almost universal adoption of t h e tacit assumption t h a t t h e interaction I is one-way, from 0 to S. When S is a system of macroparticles as in, say, t h e observation of an oscillating pendulum in mechanics, it is defexsible to argue t h a t t h e pendulum cannot "see" 0 o r , a t least, t h e pendulum has no awareness of 0 as a system with which it is in interaction. Hence, t h e r e is no notion of control complexity and t h e rewlation and management of S by 0 proceeds according t o classical principles. But when w e pass to t h e microscopic and quantum levels or to the global and cosmic levels, t h e assumption of no control complexity becomes iccreasingly difficult to defend. And by t h e time w e move to systems possessing even primitive levels of self-awareness in biology and t h e social sciences, w e can no longer neglect the inherent symmetry in t h e interaction I. The f i r s t s t e p in addressing management issues for complex systems is the explicit incorporation of control complexity into the modeling and decision-making framework.
To illustrate t h e above points, consider t h e s t r u c t u r e associated with representative government a t t h e regional o r national level. Here we have a system S composed of t h e political leaders (mayor, governor, etc.) interacting with a system 0 consisting of t h e general public. If t h e complexity of S as perceived by 0 is high, then t h e public sees its leaders as taking incomprehensible actions; they s e e a byzantine and unwieldy governmental bureaucracy and a large number of independent decision-makers (government agencies) affecting their day-to-day life. In short, what would be observed is exactly what is seen in most countries today. On t h e o t h e r hand. if t h e political leadership were to perceive t h e public as being very complex, what would their observations be? They would see a seemingly fickle, capricious public. composed of a large number of independent selfinterest groups clamoring for more and more public goods and services. Furthermore, t h e r e would be a perception t h a t t h e public interest groups were connected together in a r a t h e r elaborate network t h a t could not be decomposed into simpler subgroups. Consequently, actions o r decisions taken to address t h e interests of one group could not be isolated in their effect, which may possibly be contrary to t h e interests of another. O r , even worse, because of t h e dense web of interconnections and feedback loops comprising t h e public s t r u c t u r e , unpredictable and unpleasant side effects may emerge from actions taken t o satisfy some subgroups. It goes without saying t h a t these observations form p a r t of t h e everyday life of most public officials in t h e western world (and. most likely, t h e eastern. too).
From t h e above considerations, w e can conclude t h a t t h e c r u x of t h e problem of modern government v e r s u s its citizenry is t h a t both t h e public and t h e governing officials regard each o t h e r as complex systems. If e i t h e r recognized t h e o t h e r as simple, much of t h e tension and dissatisfaction with contemporary political structures would disappear. The ideal situation would be for each to perceive t h e o t h e r as simple, in which case both parties would b e happy. Failing this, simple government with a complex public o r complex government with a simple public would a t least reduce t h e difficulties and tensions in one direction. but with possibly increased tensions in t h e other. Local administration in a small, rural community would be representative of t h e former, while a political dictatorship of some s o r t would be typical of t h e l a t t e r situation. Unfortunately, a t t h e regional and national level throughout most of t h e western world, w e have t h e complex/complex case, which requires a deeper consideration of how each side comes to attach t h e label "complex" to t h e o t h e r , before t h e question of complexity management can be meaningfully addressed.
As emphasized earlier, complexity as a system g r o p e r t y emerges from t h e interaction of a given system with another. If a system S can interact with 0 in a large number of n o n e q u i v a l e n t ways, then S regards 0 as complex; conversely, if S has only a small number of modes of interaction with 0 , then 0 appears simple. In t h e governmental context, a dictatorship appears more complex to t h e public, because t h e public has many different modes of interaction with t h e government since, in such situations, most of t h e agencies of day-to-day life (police, military, communications, transport, agriculture, etc.) a r e directly in governmental hands. Such centrally planned s t r u c t u r e s require a high level of control complexity to maintain and a r e perceived as complex by o t h e r systems which have t o i n t e r a c t with them.
A system is counted as simple if t h e r e a r e only a small number of nonequivalent ways to interact with it. The pen I used t o write this manuscript is a simple system t o me. The only mode of interaction with i t t h a t I have available is to use i t as a writing instrument; however, if I were, say, a chemical engineer, then many more modes become available. I could analyze t h e plastic compound of which i t is made, t h e composition of chemicals forming t h e ink, t h e design of t h e writing ball a t its tip, and so forth. So, for a chemical engineer my ballpoint pen becomes a f a r more complex object than it is for me.
If w e adopt t h e position of this c h a p t e r t h a t effective management of complexity consists of arranging systems so t h a t design and control complexity a r e approximately equal, preferably a t a relatively high o r low absolute level, then w e operationally face t h e question of how t o formally characterize t h e idea of a system, an interaction between two systems, and t h e notion of equivalent intera c t ions.
Systems, Observables, and Models
For the things of this world cannot be made known without a knowledge of mathematics.
Roger Bacon
To progress beyond t h e obvious and trivial. i t is necessary to formalize t h e common language and linguistic terms used earlier t o describe system complexity and its management. Only through such a formalization can we t r a n s f e r these intuitive, but fuzzy, terms into a mathematical setting t h a t provides t h e possibility of gaining operational insight into t h e way complexity is generated and suggests how procedures can b e developed t o cope with t h e complex.
For us, a s y s t e m S is composed of an a b s t r a c t s e t of s t a t e s R, together with a collection of real-valued o b s e r v a b l e s f : R + R. For example, l e t t h e system S consist of t h e rotational symmetries of an equilateral triangle. There a r e then several candidates for t h e a b s t r a c t s t a t e space R, a s shown in Figure 6 .1. Thus, t h e r e is nothing sacred about t h e s t a t e space 12; i t is just a collection of elements t h a t n a m e , o r label, t h e possible positions of t h e triangle. A typical observable for this system would b e t h e map f , which assigns t o t h e s t a t e o E R t h e minimal number of rotations through 2n/3 needed t o reach o from t h e s t a t e [a, b , c] .
Thus, f : fl + [O, 1,2 1 C R . In this case, if w e take R = n3, then f (o) = o, but if w e use R = Ql o r Q2, then f (o) E R3. Co~sequently, for t h e observable f i t is possible to code any of t h e s t a t e s in Q2 or R3 by an element of R3; in a certain sense, R3 is a u n i v e r s a l s t a t e space for this system, relative to t h e observable f . In physics and engineering, i t has become common practice to use R = R n as a universal s t a t e space for a system involving n observables, f f In fact, a good deal of t h e a r t behind mathematical modeling in the physical sciences lies in a judicious choice of observables f 1, so t h a t t h e points of Rn serve as a universal coding scheme for t h e actual a b s t r a c t states of S. It is both remarkable and unfortunate t h a t this procedure works as well as it does: remarkable since t h e r e is no a p r i o r i reason to e x p e c t t h a t t h e natural world is constructed so as to m iformly lend itself to such an encoding scheme; unfortunate, since t h e successes in physics and engineering have generated a certain sense of unjustified confidence that a similar procedure will work equally well in the social and behavioral sciences. It does not, which accounts for a great deal of t h e difficulties found in many attempts to mimic t h e methods of physics when modeling human affairs. All that having been said, let us r e t u r n to t h e formalization of system descriptions and complexity.
From t h e (possibly infinite) s e t of all observables characterizing S , we select a subset (usually finite), F = t f f 2,..., f N j , and call F an a b s t r a c t i o n of S. Associated with t h e abstraction F is a relation, or a s e t of relations, a, between t h e observables f of F ,
Such a relationship cf, is termed an e q u a t i o n of s t a t e o r a d e s c r i p t i o n for the
system S. Since t h e observables a r e all real-valued functions of 0, if t h e r e a r e m relations, 9 : Rn -, R m .
As a simple illustration of t h e preceding ideas, let t h e system S be t h e citizenry of a country. The abstract states R of such a system might characterize t h e political mood of t h e populace. For this, w e could take where ol = very content, w2 = weakly content, o3 = divided, w4 = some dissatisfaction, w5 = great unrest. Two (of many) observables for this system could be f l,
t h e fraction of t h e population favorably disposed to t h e political party in power, and f 2, t h e fraction neutral o r opposed to t h e current regime. The actual numerical values of f and f when t h e system is in any state, o E R, need t o b e determined on empirical grounds. However, w e always have t h e equation of s t a t e for any w E R.
In t h e above situation, t h e r e is no notion of causality. The observables of F and t h e equation of state cf, a r e simply quantities t h a t represent our view of t h e system S ; they compactly summarize our experimental and observational knowledge of S ; t h a t is. t h e data. The common manner in which a causal structure is imposed upon t h e observables is through t h e recognition that in all systems t h e r e a r e noticeably different time-scales according to which t h e values of the observables change. We can employ (tacitly o r directly) these time-scales to induce a notion of order, o r a causal structure, upon F.
To see how a causal structure can b e introduced, imagine a system S characterized by an abstraction F = f f N j involving N observables. Further, assume that observation has shown t h a t t h e observables change on t h r e e time-scales, slow, medium, and fast, for example. For t h e sake of exposition, let t h e observables be labeled so that
Let A , U , and Y represent t h e range of values of t h e observables a , u , and y , respectively. By t h e preceding argument, w e have A C R~, U C R n , and Y C R m , where n = q -k and m = n -q . The causal relationship is induced by invoking t h e principle that slow dynamics force, o r cause, fast dynamics. Thus, w e regard a and u as causing y . In common parlance, t h e slow variables a a r e generally termed p a r a m e t e r s , while t h e medium-speed, causal variables u a r e termed i
n p u t s ( c o n t r o l s , d e c i s i o n s ) . The response variables y a r e t h e system o u t p u t s .
Usually, t h e r e is a feedback effect in that u , and sometimes a , is modified by t h e output y . But t h e important point h e r e is that when w e think of some observables causing others, it is t h e rate-of-change of t h e observables that produces t h e temporal ordering which we assign to t h e system. Thus, causality is not necessarily a natural o r i n t r i n s i c aspect of S , but r a t h e r is introduced by t h e way the observer perceives t h e various time-scales a t work in the system. In t h e classical physical sciences, this point is not usually particularly important and becomes significant only a t cosmic and quantum levels; however, in t h e social and behavioral sciences i t is an issue a t t h e very outset, and partially accounts for t h e difficulties in economic and social modeling of deciding what causes what, a question which lies a t t h e h e a r t of any s o r t of predictive modeling.
A b e t t e r intuitive understanding of t h e partitioning of t h e system observables is obtained if w e employ an evolutionary metaphor. The slow variables a can b e thought of a s specifying t h e system genotype; t h a t is, t h e a s p e c t s of S t h a t enable us t o recognize t h e system as S and not some o t h e r system Sf. For instance, in a n urban environment, a might code information about t h e local geographic, cultural, political, and economic s t r u c t u r e t h a t allows us t o know w e a r e in Omsk r a t h e r than Tomsk. The medium-speed observables u correspond t o t h e system's e n v i r o n m e n t . Thus, u r e p r e s e n t s e i t h e r natural environmental factors o r those c r e a t e d b y decision-makers. Finally, t h e outputs y characterize t h e morphostructure, o r form, of S , t h e so-called system p h e n o t y p e . For many social systems, y r e p r e s e n t s t h e behavioral responses of S to genetic mutation (change of a ) and/or environmental fluctuation (change of u ) . In t h e urban c o n t e x t , u may reflect various actions b y policymakers, such as imposition of zoning restrictions, urban renewal legislation, and t h e like, while y would t h e n display t h e effects of those environmental decisions, together with t h e given genotype (city), as new housing developments, modifications of t r a n s p o r t channels, redistribution of industry, and so forth. The important point is t h e relative time-scales of t h e processes. Now l e t us t u r n t o t h e c e n t r a l question of this section: how t o decide whether two descriptions, o r models, of t h e same system a r e equivalent. In t h e above terminology, w e have t h e description and t h e description both purporting t o describe t h e same system S , and our question is whether t h e two descriptions convey t h e same information about S o r , what amounts t o t h e same thing, do @ and 8 provide independent descriptions of S?
Mathematically. t h e descriptions 4, and a r e e q u i v a l e n t if t h e r e e x i s t maps g and h , depending on a and G , such t h a t t h e following diagram commutes:
The existence. properties, and construction of t h e maps g a t s and h a S 8 depend strongly upon t h e mathematical s t r u c t u r e assumed f o r t h e s e t s U and Y and t h e descriptions Q a and 6;. W e do not discuss t h e s e matters h e r e . A purely matheaatical treatment of t h e above question forms t h e c o r e of singularity theory, which is covered in detail by Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973) , Lu (1976) , and Gibson (1979) . The systems view of singularity theory as outlined above is treated in Casti (1984) .
It is worthwhile to pursue, for a moment, t h e implications of system equivalence. If 0, and gg a r e equivalent, it means t h a t a change of t h e parameter a to a^ can be neutralized, o r cancelled out, by a corresponding relabeling of t h e elements of t h e sets U and Y. Speaking metaphorically, if w e regard S as an organism described by @, , then t h e genetic mutation a -, a^ can be made invisible by an appropriate modification of t h e environment U and t h e phenotype Y. When put in such terms, t h e notion of system equivalence is strongly reminiscent of t h e theory of biological transformations originally developed by dlArcy Thompson in t h e early 1900s. In that theory, an attempt was made to show that a common genetic struct u r e in the past could be inferred from phenotypic equivalence in t h e present. In other words, two species (y, c) with different genotypes ( a # 6 ) in t h e p r e s e n t , would be considered to have arisen from a common ancestor (a = a^) in t h e past, if t h e r e is a phenotypic transformation h which transforms one species into t h e other. This is clearly a special case of our diagram when t h e environment U is held fixed (g = identity). For given genotypes a and 6 , i t may be that t h e r e exist no transformations g and h which enable us to pass from 0, to gg. In this case, t h e r e exist mutations & near a that result in qualitatively different ?henotypic structures. Such a situation forms t h e underlying basis for a theory of bifurcation and catastrophes, which w e consider in more detzil below.
The Emergence of Complexity
The electron is not as simple as it looks.
Sir W l l i a n Bragg
The complexity of a system S is a contingent property, depending upon t h e nature of the observables describing S, t h e observables characterizing t h e system 0 measuring S, and their mutual interactions. Imagine that 0 sees S in an operational mode which 0 describes by t h e equation of s t a t e 4,. Further, suppose that a t another time 0 sees S in t h e mode bg. If 0 and dg are equivalent, in t h e sense described above. 0 concludes that S is manifesting essentially t h e same behavior in t h e two modes, and 0 is able to use equally well e i t h e r description to characterize both modes of S. On t h e other hand, if 0, P SB (i.e.. they a r e not equivalent), 0 is unable to reduce one description to t h e other and regards t h e operation of S as being more complex, since 0 sees more variety in t h e possible modes of S ' s behavior. This simple idea forms t h e nucleus of our main thesis that complexity of S = t h e number of nonequivalent descriptions (relative to 0) 0, t h a t 0 can generate for S .
Interchanging t h e roles of S and 0 , t h e conplexity of 0 relative to S is defined in a similar manner. Let us denote these two complexities as Co(S) and CS(0), respectively. Thus, Co(S) is what we earlier termed design complexity, while CS(0) is t h e control complexity of t h e joint system S and 0.
A crucial aspect of our notion of system complexity is t h a t i t is a comparat i v e concept: t h e r e is a tacit assumption t h a t in o r d e r to compute CO(S), 0 must have available a f a m i l y of descriptions of S and a method for deciding whether o r not two descriptions from t h e family a r e equivalent. If Q denotes t h e family of descriptions, t h e above procedure defines an equivalence relation on Q , t h e r e b y partitioning i t into appropriate equivalence classes. Since, by definition, all descriptions belonging to a given class a r e equivalent, t h e number CO(S) is just equal to t h e number of classes t h a t Q is separated into by our concept of system equivalence. To operationally implement this procedure, t h e following s t e p s a r e needed:
(1) Beginning with a fixed description S construct a family Q of descriptions containing S as a member. One fairly standard way of doing this has already been described above, when w e begin with t h e description 4Cfl,..., f N ) and isolate some observables as parameters a . The values of a then provide a parameterized family of descriptions of S .
(2) Partition Q into equivalence classes in accordance with t h e equivalence relation "-" described earlier. To accomplish this task, i t is necessary t o employ (3) Calculate CO(S) = c a r d Q/-= t h e number of classes into which Q is split by t h e relation -.
In terms of management and decision-making, i t is 0 who must select t h e family Q and t h e relation -; different selections lead to different levels of complexity as perceived by 0 . Similar remarks apply t o t h e view of 0 as seen by S .
A simple example in which t h e above concepts a r e explicitly displayed is when cf, : U -+ Y is linear with U = R n , Y = Rm . In this case, cf, can b e r e p r e s e n t e d by an m x n matrix, once bases a r e chosen in U and Y. In o r d e r t o parameterize t h e description (6, let us suppose t h a t w e regard t h e f i r s t diagonal element of as a parameter; that is a = [ @I l 1. The e x a c t complexity, of course, depends upon t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e fixed elements of a,. If, f o r example, r a n k Qa is constant f o r all a E R , t h e n complexity a, = 1. Thus, complexity Q a = number of different values t h a t r a n k 9 , assumes a s a ranges over R.
In passing, w e note t h a t t h e points a* E R a t which @, changes r a n k are
what w e e a r l i e r termed bifurcation points. They r e p r e s e n t places where t h e i n h e r e n t information in t h e description 9 , ( h e r e r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e number of linearly independent rows of @,, f o r example) is different from t h a t in 9,. f o r a n e a r a*. W e r e t u r n t o t h i s point in a more general c o n t e x t l a t e r . In summary, complexity emerges from simplicity when alternative descriptions of a system are not reducible t o e a c h o t h e r . For a given o b s e r v e r , t h e more such inequivalent descriptions h e o r s h e generates, t h e more complex t h e system appears. Conversely, a complex system can b e simplified in one of two ways: reduce t h e number of potential descriptions (by r e s t r i c t i n g t h e observer's means of interaction with t h e system) and/or use a c o a r s e r notion of system equivalence, thus reducing t h e number of equivalence classes. The f i r s t s t r a t e g y is exemplified b y a decision-maker who listens t o only a f e w advisors before making a decision r a t h e r t h a n gathering a full spectrum of views on a particular issue; a failure t o dig d e e p enough t o g e t all t h e f a c t s surrounding a situation before taking action would b e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e second approach t o simplification. Both approaches are considered in more detail below, b u t f i r s t !et us examine some of t h e ways in which t h e complexity of a system can change in a natural manner.
The Evolution of Complexity
In s h o r t , the notion of s t r u c t u r e is comprised of t h r e e key ideas: the idea of wholeness, t h e idea of transformation, and t h e idea of self-regulation. J. Piaget I t has been recognized, a t least since t h e work of Turing and von Neumann on self-reproducing machines, t h a t in o r d e r for a system t o evolve t o a higher level of complexity, it is necessary f o r t h e system to contain i t s own self-description. W e might well ask why it would not b e possible t o design a self-reproducing system with given functional c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s using hardware alone, without also requiring an internal linguistic description of what i t is doing. The answer lies in t h e conditions f o r reliability, adaptation, growth, and evolution t h a t w e use t o c h a r a c t e r i z e complex systems; w e are not i n t e r e s t e d in a system whose natural tendency is t o degenerate o r lose i t s function. Systems t h a t contain t h e i r own genetic description a r e one known t y p e of organization t h a t allows survival and evolution d e s p i t e e r r o r s within t h e system, o r even e r r o r s in t h e description. In general, w e have only a feeble understanding of t h e explicit conditions for t h e linguistic descriptions needed to achieve t h e threshold of reliability and adaptability necessary for survival and evolution.
In t h e above view, a complex system is a composite consisting of a physical s t r u c t u r e (the hardware) carrying out functions under t h e instructions of an internal description of itself (the software). This situation would be well understood, as it is in computer science, if it were not for t h e fact t h a t in most systems of interest t h e hardware and software a r e contained in t h e same physical structure. A key problem in t h e understanding of complex processes is t h e way in which t h e dynamic modes of t h e system interact with t h e linguistic modes, and t h e manner in which these complementary modes a r e combined t o provide an external observer with some level of complexity, as outlined earlier. If we regard a meas u r e m e n t process as a physical s t r u c t u r e t h a t executes a rule which relates a system to an element of its description, then t h e encoding of dynamical processes t o linguistic s t r u c t u r e s is very closely related to measurement. On t h e o t h e r hand. t h e decoding and physical execution of a genetic description is a problem of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The measurement/interpretation complementarity can be very easily demons t r a t e d by examining ordinary human speech. W e can e i t h e r say what w e mean o r w e can examine how w e have said it, but w e can't do both simultaneously. We can represent physical structures as descriptions only when w e recognize t h a t t h e structures a r e obeying a coherent s e t of rules, which w e call a language. And i t is in this language t h a t w e formulate our concepts of complexity or simplicity. The irony in this picture is t h a t t h e natural language w e use t o identify complexity may cause us to i n t e r p r e t inherently simple events, as seen by t h e internal language of our self-describing system. as complex messages in our interpretative natural language. An important component in t h e management of complexity is the institution of procedures t o bring t h e internal and natural languages much closer, and so to prevent t h e external observer from receiving a message t h a t is not really in t h e system itself.
Considerations of s t r u c t u r e and description also bear heavily upon t h e emergent complexity arising out of lower level, simpler processes. If w e think of t h e evolutionary process, in general, as a mapping of environmental variety and constraints into t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e evolving system in t h e form of organizing principles and coded information, then i t is possible t o distinguish t h r e e quite distinct evolutionary strategies: t h e phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and sociogenic. Let us consider these strategies in light of our earlier remarks.
Phylogenetic. This strategy involves random genetic mutations and gene mixing which a r e tested in t h e i r phenotypic forms by interaction with environmental stresses. The successful s t r u c t u r e s (if any) result in t h e blind, natural selection of t h e corresponding genotypes. In terms of our earlier formalism, t h e map @, : U -, Y is modified by purely random changes in a with future a~t a t i o n s of a entirely unaffected by t h e resulting phenotypes y,(u). Such a strategy is enormously profligate ar?d slow, permitting rapid environmental fluctuations to reduce t h e viability of species before t h e phylogenetic mapping can c a t c h up as, f o r example, with t h e extinction of t h e dinosaurs.
Ontogenetic. If t h e system has some means of storing t h e results of mutations in a , f o r example, with some neurophysiological s t r u c t u r e like a brain, then instead of random genetic changes, w e have selective trial-and-error probings of t h e environment. In short, t h e genetic changes a r e directed by what has gone before in a process called Learning. Such an ontogenetic strategy permits a more rapid and refined process of information generation about t h e environment; t h e r e is an adaptive mechanism by which successful phenotypic characteristics a r e fed back to t h e gene pool to promote f u r t h e r genotypic changes. W e might think of this feedback o r learning mechanism as embodied in t h e neural code of t h e system, as opposed to its genetic code. However, this strategy also has its drawbacks, principally t h e fact t h a t t h e information is stored in t h e system and goes out of existence with its death.
Saciogenic. This strategy is associated with systems t h a t are not only social, as in various insect societies, but also sociocultural, which involves not only a permanent social organization. but also an a r b i t r a r y symbolic coding of t h e role relationships in t h e society. A t this level, the sociogenic strategy of evolution involves an additional code, t h e narmative code, which is stored outside t h e physical system itself. Thus, t h e information about t h e environment does not die with t h e system and. in fact, can be passed on to new systems without their having to first directly experience the actual environmental interactions. In this strategy, besides t h e advantage of e x tra-somatic storage of information, t h e r e is t h e possibility of t h e system restructuring itself very rapidly when environmental pressures become great enough.
In t h e sociogenic strategy, we pass from a variation of t h e genetic code to mutations of t h e normative code, which guides t h e social and psychological development of new generations. Instead of a gene pool comprising t h e system's stock of coded information, t h e r e is an idea pool which is a reservoir of t h e culture's templates for t h e coordination and integration of individual actions and interactions. New ideas or ideologies a r e continually generated as mutations, subject to various selection pressures, with reproductive success measured by the perpetuation of one normative system and social s t r u c t u r e as opposed to others.
As a simple illustration of sociocultural evolution, consider t h e development of societal regulatory mechanisms; t h a t is, t h e dominant political structures. The appearance of democratic forms of social regulation represents, from t h e purely objective point of view of cybernetics, t h e evolution of a more adaptive political structure. For example, a more extensive idea pool, fuller information and feedback channels in t h e system, and a more extensive mapping of t h e internal as well as external s t a t e s of t h e system and environment.
Of special importance is t h e balance between those institutional structures and processes designed t o maintain a given s t r u c t u r e and those designed to enable b e t t e r adaptation to environmental conditions. The former structures a r e much more strongly incorporated into t h e micro-and macros t r u c t u r e of t h e political system than t h e l a t t e r ; hence, pressures tend t o mount until t h e old s t r u c t u r e can be changed only through potentially destructive revolution -a singularly poor strategy for evoluton.
Our previous consideration of system complexity as a property of t h e interaction between a system and its observer/regulator applies a t each level of t h e above evolutionary scheme. However, w e can also think of t h e emergence of a new type of system complexity as w e pass from t h e phylogenetic to sociogenic strategies. This is an evolution not of t h e complexity displayed by a fixed system, but r a t h e r a qualitative change of t h e type of system from individual, nonlearning units to social collections of adaptive units, each system type requiring its own complexity concept. W e touch on some of these distinctions in t h e next section which deals with t h e interrelationships between system complexity and t h e concep t s of adaptation. hierarchy, and bifurcation.
Complex Systems: Adaptation, Hierarchy, and Bifurcation
T h e r e is nothing in t h e whole world t h a t is permanent. Everything flows onward; all things a r e brought into being with a changing n a t u r e ; t h e a g e s themselves glide by in constant movement.
Treatments of complexity often place great emphasis upon various behavioral o r structural characteristics of a system, which, if present. offer supposed prima facie evidence t h a t t h e system is complex. by whatever interpretation t h e author is advocating. Three of t h e most commonly cited characteristics are:
Adaptability. The capacity for t h e system t o monitor its environment and to reconfigure itself on t h e basis of its observations in o r d e r t o more effectively perform its function. Hiararchy. The tendency for t h e system to be structurally organized in a stratified manner so t h a t information and activities a t lower levels a r e combined as inputs to higher levels, while overall direction and control passes from higher t o lower levels. Bifurcation and novelty. The tendency for complex processes t o spontaneously display a shift from one behavioral o r structural mode to another, as levels of organization increase. These surprises o r emergent novelties represent points of bifurcation where a previous description of t h e system breaks down and a new description, not reducible to t h e old, is required.
While it should be clear by now t h a t w e do not hold to t h e view t h a t any of t h e above features is an infallible indicator of complexity, it certainly is true t h a t
many complex phenomena are hierarchically structured, do display emergent behavioral modes, and c a n adapt t o new situations. Consequently, i t is of interest to examine how well these system properties can be accommodated to t h e complexi t y concept introduced earlier in this chapter.
Adaptation
Consider t h e capability of a system to adapt t o changing conditions in t h e environment. This is a functional concept involving a t least some subsystems changing their functional behavior to accommodate t h e new environment. A political system granting voting rights to women in response to egalitarian social c u r r e n t s , a s in Switzerland in r e c e n t times, is t h e type of adaptive change a complex system can often make. So is t h e way in which banks have been introduced into modern economic s t r u c t u r e s a s an adaptation t o provide for intertemporal exchanges in disequilibrium. Here, a subsystem whose previous function was only to a c t a s a storehouse of wealth. has changed i t s function t o provide credit and o t h e r services which allow an economy to sustain a continual s t a t e of disequilibrium. One might say, even. t h a t all adaptation arises as a result of a principle of function change, whereby subsystems c r e a t e d for one function begin to perform a quite different function when t h e system perceives t h e new function t o b e evolutionarily more advantageous than t h e old. The classical biological example of this kind of shift is t h e evolution of t h e human eye, which cannot confer any survival advantage until i t sees and cannot see until i t is highly evolved and complex. Thus, i t is difficult to imagine how such an organ could arise a s t h e result of minute differential changes in a fixed organ, even over millions of years. It is much more reasonable to suppose t h a t originally t h e eye performed a function quite different from sight and an accidental feature of this proto-eye was t h a t i t was photosensitive. As time wore on, t h e photosensitivity feature became more and more evolutionarily advantageous and t h e original function of t h e e y e was lost.
The picture of adaptation as being a system response t o changed circumstances leads to t h e basic evolutionary equation
expressing t h e fact t h a t , in o r d e r to adapt, t h e system must have many potential modes of behavior and a procedure f o r evaluating t h e relative fitness of t h e various alternatives in a given environment. One of t h e difficulties with complex human social systems is t h a t redundancy a t t h e genetic level, which gives t h e capacity for independent variations, is too limited. As a result, t h e r e is too little room for trying new approaches and for exploring alternative pathways to a given functional goal when operating circumstances change. Systems such as large nuclear power plants, national economies, major ecosystems, and t h e like have little, if any, degrees of freedom in their s t r u c t u r e or design with which to experiment. The consequences of a failure a r e too great to allow t h e evolutionary equation t o operate effectively, a t least in i t s natural mode. In our view, until more resilient design policies are employed for such large-scale systems, t h e only possible way to escape this prison of hypotheticality is b y way of mathematical models and computer exploration of alternative systems, r a t h e r than by relying upon nature's trial-and-error. On balance this is probably a b e t t e r strategy anyway, since we don't have millions o r even hundreds of years to find solutions to our energy, economic, and environmental problems. But t h e potential Achilles heel in t h e computer simulation strategy is t h a t i t is totally dependent upon t h e existence of faithful models of reality, expressible in mathesatlcal terms. Thus, t h e weight of t h e e n t i r e edifice is concentrated upon t h e need to develop a science of modeling and effective procedures for t h e identification of "good" models of human and natural phenomena.
To incorporate t h e above ideas into our earlier formalism, we must introduce a feedback mechanism through which environmental fluctuations a r e sensed by t h e system and used t o generate exploratory variations In t h e system's "genomes". Recalling t h a t t h e basic description (or model) of t h e system is given by a family of relations * , : U -r Y , inclusion of adaptive capabilities requires two steps:
(1) Feedback/feedfortoard loops. The system genome a is now thought of as being a t least partially determined by e i t h e r c u r r e n t and past s t a t e s of t h e environment (feedback). in which case a = a [u ( t -T)] and/or upon predicted future s t a t e s of t h e environment (feedforward). In t h e l a t t e r event, a = a[c(t + T)]. Here T is some time-lag, while 12 denotes t h e predicted future environmental state. There a r e good arguments for both feedback and feedforward mechanisms in adaptive s t r u c t u r e s and, most likely, any truly self -organizing complex s t m c t u r e develops both modes for coping with environmental change.
(2) S e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e . Implicit in t h e above feedback/feedforward mechanism
is a selection procedure; t h e environment is sensed and predicted and a m l e is applied which tells t h e system how t o modify its genome to best fit t h e changed circumstances. Thus. t h e feedback/f eedf orward loops r e p r e s e n t both random and directed search in t h e space of t h e genomes, together with a procedure to weed out t h e "good" genetic p a t t e r n s from t h e "bad".
A t this point it is useful to note t h e distinction between t h e adaptive capability of an individual system and t h e effect t h a t t h e association of individuals in a society has on this capacity. Basically, t h e adaptive capacity of an individual is reduced, but group adaptive capacity is increased as individuals join together in cellular societies. The key point h e r e is t h a t the group capacity is increased, but on a much longer time-scale than t h a t for individuals. Thus, individual companies join together t o form a multinational conglomerate, t h e r e b y gaining a group ability to respond to global economic fluctuations t h a t no individual member could easily accommodate, but on a much longer time-scale than t h e reaction time of a typical firm. It is probably fair to say t h a t higher-level associations only arise through defects in t h e adaptive capability of individuals. More than any o t h e r factor, i t is this limited adaptive capacity of individuals t h a t gives rise t o t h e hierarchical organizations so typically present in complex systems.
Hierarchy
The failure of individual subsystems to b e sufficiently adaptive to changing environments results in t h e subsystems forming a collective association t h a t , a s a unit, is b e t t e r able to function in new circumstances. Formation of such an association is a s t r u c t u r a l change; t h e behavioral role of t h e new conglomerate is a f u n c t i o n a l change; both types of change a r e characteristic of t h e formation of hierarchies. It has been argued by Simon (1969 Simon ( , 1981 
, as well as others, t h a t evolution favors those systems t h a t display stable, intermediate Levels of s t r u c t u r e .
Furthermore, a complex system is incomprehensible unless w e can simplify it by using alternative Levels of d e s c r i p t i o n . A digital computer illustrates both types of hierarchies, where we have structural o r hardware levels from microchips to functional units like disc drives, terminals, processors, and so on. On the descriptive side, w e have t h e system software which describes what t h e structural levels a r e to do, using a series of descriptive levels from machine languages to high-level. natural-language programming languages.
In a hierarchical structure, t h e various levels of organization r e f e r primarily to different ways in which it is possible for us to interact with t h e system, i.e. nonequivalent types of s t a t e descriptions generate different hierarchical levels. It is not possible. for instance, to understand t h e machine language operations represented by a particular BASIC statement without moving away from t h e level of BASIC to t h e more microscopic level of machine instructions. The two descriptions a r e incompatible in much the same way that it is impossible to understand a biological organism by studying its individual atoms and molecules. Of course, t h e same situations occur repeatedly in economics under t h e rubric micro-macro problems, as well as in urban studies, psychology, sociology, and many other areas.
It is interesting to note that in hierarchical organizations, t h e organizational characteristics Look t h e s a m e a t each level, in that t h e dynamics and structural interactions a t each level appear to be models of each other. This feature was noted long ago by Haeckel in his bioenergetic law -"ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", expressing the observation that each organism carries t h e entire history of the phylum within itself. Other examples of this principle abound: computer programs and their subroutines, a symphony and its various movements, a neural network and t h e associated network of genetic control, a book and its component chapters. and so on. Some of these hierarchies a r e structural, while others a r e functional, and it appears safe to say that t h e central problem of hierarchy theory is t h e understanding of t h e relation between t h e structural and t h e descriptive (or functional) levels. Most of t h e classical physical sciences have concentrated upon s truc t u r d decompositons, culminating in today's multimillion-dollar searches for t h e ultimate particles of matter. This is suitable for t h e study of physics, but for an understanding of living systems (biological, human, social) it is necessary to look for f u n c t i o n a l decompositions: t h e new reductionism will b e based upon units of function and description, not units of structure.
How can t h e preceding concepts of hierarchical levels b e incorporated into our mathematical formulation? A t t h e structural level, the atoms of our modeling formalism a r e t h e real-valued observables f : R + R , where R is t h e system's s e t of abstract states. In a loose sense, I f t 1 a r e t h e s t a t e variables of t h e model. Structural hierarchies a r e formed by combining these s t a t e variables, either by aggregation o r disaggregation, into new quantities. Imagine that w e have n observables that can be collectively written f = Cfl...., f , ) . A hierarchy is formed by prescribing a rule for combining these quantities into m new observables, A f = (fl, fz ,..., 1; that is each ft = f (fl ,..., f , ) . Diagrammatically, w e have in which, t h e map @ is either an imbedding or a projection of R n + R m , depending upon whether n < m o r n > m . The interesting p a r t of t h e diagram involves t h e map a and t h e new s t a t e space n. Since (n,?) represent a different hierarchical level than (Q, f ), i t is generally t h e case that Q Z fi; that is, t h e s e t of states appropriate for characterizing t h e system a t a given level is not generally t h e s t a t e s e t appropriate for another level. But t h e diagram makes i t clear that t h e r e is some flexibility in passing from fl to fi. We can either choose a, thereby fixing t h e new s t a t e s e t fi, o r w e can choose 0 and then determine a from t h e relation @ of = 70 a. The picture sketched above provides a prototypical framework for all structural stratifications that involve t h e introduction of hierarchies through aggregation and disaggregation.
The descriptive stratification proceeds on t h e basis that t h e system activity is determined by t h e equation of s t a t e that links its observables. Thus, t h e function that t h e system performs is described by t h e rule Earlier, w e subdivided t h e observables using cause-and-effect arguments and wrote this relationship as Now let us consider what is implied when t h e system passes to a new descriptive level a t which a new function is performed. In our context it can mean only one thing: t h e equation of s t a t e @ has been modified to a new equation 5, possibly (but not necessarily) with a change of observables from f -, y; t h a t is, in diagrammatic form W e have already discussed t h e ramifications of this diagram and note h e r e only that t h e appearance of a new functional hierarchical level is abstractly t h e same as t h e occurrence of a bifurcation in t h e system description. Consequently, t h e emergence of new functional hierarchies is completely intertwined with t h e conc e p t of system bifurcation, and an understanding of t h e system's functional levels of organization can only occur through a deeper investigation of t h e number and type of its bifurcation points.
Bifurcation, Ekror, and Surprise
Earlier, w e considered t h e situation in which t h e r e were two descriptions of * a given system, say 9, and Q6, and addressed t h e question of when w e could mean-* ingfully say that Q, was equivalent to 6&. It was argued that 9, -9 -if maps g a and h could be found such that t h e diagram above commutes. In other words. is a bifurcation point for t h e description 6). We then d e f i n e t h e complexity of t h e system in terms of t h e number of bifurcation points. So in this sense, a system S is more complex than a system S' if our description of S contains more bifurcation points than our description f o r S'. Thus, t h e concept of system complexity and t h e idea of a bifurcation a r e intimately linked a t t h e very outset of our theory: increased complexi t y can only emerge a t a bifurcation point and, conversely, every bifurcation point gives rise to a new mode of system behavior t h a t is not reducible (i.e. understandable) in terms of t h e old. Now let us consider a quite different way in which bifurcations can generate emergent behavior when two systems a r e made to interact with each other.
Consider t h e simple situation in which we have R = t h e real numbers R , and t h e observables f = C f l...., f ,), a r e defined as
r + i t h coefficient in t h e decimal expansion of r Then, clearly, r l , r 2 E R a r e equivalent with r e s p e c t to t h e observables f when r l and T 2 agree in t h e f i r s t n terms of t h e i r decimal expansions. Now choose numbers r ; , r;;! such that Now we let t h e 1-system i n t e r a c t with t h e 2-system through multiplication; t h a t is, we form t h e products r3= ( r 1 r 2 ) and r j = ( r i r ; ; ! ) and find that. in general, r 3 7L /~j ; t h a t is, t h e equivalence classes under f a r e split by t h e interaction (i.e., by t h e dynamics). In o t h e r words, t h e interaction generates a bifurcation of t h e f -classes, a bifurcation t h a t we usually call round-off error, In t h e above cont e x t . It is instructive to examine t h e source of this so-called e r r o r . To see t h e way t h e e r r o r is introduced in t h e above situation, l e t us consider a numerical example. Let r = 123, r i = 124, r = 234, and r ;;! = 235, and use f = C f l , f 2 ) ; t h a t is, t h e equivalence relation generated by f is such t h a t two numbers a r e equivalent if they agree in t h e first two places. Here we have r1 r 2 (= 28782) Ic r i r;;! ( = 29140), a discrepancy with our expectation based on t h e f -equivalence. Our surprise a t finding r r 2 7L r ; r i occurs because t h e s e t of observables f = C f l , f 2) is too limited, thereby causing an unrealistic expectation concerning t h e interaction between t h e 1-and 2-systems. If we had expanded t h e s e t of observables to t h e s e t 7 = C f l , f 2 , f 3). then no such discrepancy would have occurred. since t h e r e would b e no equivalence. a t all, of r l , r i under f^. So.
t h e entire source of our observed e r r o r is purely from t h e incompleteness in t h e description of t h e system. The preceding arguments a r e entirely general: e r r o r (or surprise) always involves a discrepancy between t h e objects (systems) o p e n t o interaction and t h e abstractions (models, descriptions) closed to those same interactions. The remedy is equally clear, in principle: just supplement t h e description by adding more observables to account f o r t h e unmodeled interactions. In this sense, e r r o r and surprise a r e indistinguishable from bifurcations. A particular description is inadequate to account f o r uncontrollable variability in equivalent states and w e need a new description to remove t h e e r r o r .
It is interesting to note that since bifurcation and error/surprise a r e identical concepts, and t h a t complexity arises as a result of potential for bifurcation. w e must conclude t h a t complexity implies surprise and error; t h a t is, to say a system displays counter-intuitive behavior is t h e same as saying that t h e system has t h e capacity for making errors, although t h e e r r o r is not i n t r i n s i c to an isolated system, but occurs when a system interacts with another.
Models, Complexity, and Management
The man who draws up a program f o r t h e f u t u r e is a reactionary.
Karl Man:
It .has been said that t h e reason w e construct models is to be able to say "because". Coping with complexity involves t h e creation of faithful models of not only t h e system to be managed, but also of t h e management system itself. As w e have continually emphasized, complexity, its identification and control, is an interactive concept between t h e system and its manager and it is impossible for t h e management system to effectively regulate t h e controlled system without having a concept (read: model) of itself, as well as of t h e system to be managed. This self-description is essential if t h e management system is to survive in t h e face of inevitable e r r o r and environmental disturbances of t h e type discussed above. In our earlier terms, effective complexity management reduces to t h e simple prescription design complexity = control complexity.
But, what is involved in reaching this s t a t e of system-theoretic nirvana?
One aspect w e can be certain of is that the search for effective management of complexity does not necessarily involve simplifying t h e process to be regulated. A s Einstein pointed out, things should be as simple as possible, but no simpler, which w e could translate as reducing t h e design complexity to t h e level of t h e control complexity, but no lower. Turning this argument around, w e can also think of i n c r e a s i n g t h e complexity of t h e management system to bring i t into line with t h e design complexity of the system. Thus, effective complexity management may involve e i t h e r simplifying o r complexif ying, depending upon t h e circumstances. But, in either case, i t is first necessary to have means for assessing t h e levels of complexity of t h e two interacting systems. Thus, w e must begin to develop t h e framework for a t h e o r y of models, one that includes effective methods for identifying the complexity of interacting systems and t h e means by which t h e conflicting complexity levels can be brought into harmonious balance.
Imagine, for a moment, that such a theory of models already exists and consider t h e types of mangement strategies that would serve to balance design and control complexities a t some acceptably high level. First, w e note that it is not sufficient simply to equalize t h e complexity levels of the system and its observer/controller. They must be balanced a t a sufficiently high level: if I simplify a Chopin piano sonata by requiring t h a t i t b e played only on t h e white keys. I have certainly reduced its complexity level t o t h e level of my observational ability (complexity) t o understand t h e piece. However, I obtain very little pleasure from this kind of complexity balance; t h e variety t h a t makes t h e piece interesting has been destroyed and I would probably benefit more with no system a t all t o observe. In this situation. i t is f a r more reasonable to raise t h e complexity level of my observing system t o match t h e level of t h e piece, which presumably already exists a t a high enough level t o perform i t s intended function. So, any management scheme must begin b y taking into account t h e absolute level a t which t h e design and control complexities a r e to be equalized.
In terms of general control strategies, t h e r e a r e two complementary approaches. One is to develop bifurcation-free and bifurcation-generating feedback policies. As has been noted elsewhere. feedback laws have t h e effect of changing t h e internal s t r u c t u r e of t h e system t h e y regulate. Of course, in our context this means t h a t any feedback policy has t h e potential t o change t h e design complexity of t h e controlled system. Some illustrations of how this can b e done are discussed in Casti (1980) . although from t h e somewhat different perspective of optimal control theory, not t h e more general setting discussed h e r e .
From a management point of view, t h e r e a r e some disadvantages t o using feedback policies, t h e principle one being t h a t any error-actuated feedback law does not even begin t o a c t until t h e system is already out of control: t h a t is, if t h e r e is no e r r o r , t h e system is not being regulated a t all. For many engineering systems this situation is quite satisfactory, but in social and behavioral processes w e cannot usually b e so sanguine about error-actuated control. Generally, in such systems w e would like t o a n t i c i p a t e difficulties and take action now t o avoid projected malfunctions later. In human systems, w e cannot afford t h e luxury of waiting for t h e system t o fail before w e take remedial action. This basic principle leads t o t h e idea of a n t i c i p a t o r y control and feedforward policies.
The most important feature of anticipatory control systems is t h a t t h e manager must have a model of t h e system to b e regulated, and his o r h e r actions a r e dictated by t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s between t h e behavior of t h e system, a s predicted by t h e model (which is run on a time-scale f a s t e r than real-time), and t h e actual, observed system behavior a t t h e future time of t h e model prediction. The prediction and observation a r e then correlated and t h e model recalibrated, leading to t h e idea of adaptive control. Surprisingly, t h e r e seems t o have Seen very little study of such processes, although some r e c e n t work by Rosen (1979 Rosen ( , 1984 promises t o redress this imbalance of knowledge between feedback and f eedf orward regulators.
From t h e above, t h e broad outline of a research program for complexity management begins to emerge, and consists of t h e following major components:
(1) A Theory of Models. There is a need for development of a sufficiently rich theoretical framework for mathematically representing processes in t h e social, behavioral, and cultural environment. This theory must of necessity include methods for identifying relevant observables, s t a t e spaces, and equations of s t a t e , as well as provide a basis for formally incorporating t h e complexity, adaptation, hierarchy, and emergence concepts discussed above.
(2) A n t i c i p a t o r y Control.
A deep investigation into t h e nature of feedforward policies as opposed to feedback is needed, in o r d e r t o provide t h e means for balancing complexity levels between t h e manager/decision-maker/ observer and t h e sys tern under consideration. Such an investigation will include studies of adaptive mechanisms, as well as t h e role of anticipatory policies in reducing/generating bifurcations in t h e managed system descriptions.
Each of these points need considerable elaboration before t h e y can constit u t e a plan for a truly creative research program. But already it is clear t h a t creative research is what is needed if any progress a t all is t o b e made in t h e complexity management problem. And h e r e t h e emphasis is on t h e word creative: no pedestrian. pull-the-pieces-of f -the-shelf -and-put-them-tog t h e t y p e of program will suffice. New ideas and new approaches a r e t h e only currency of this realm. I t seems appropriate t o close by stating a f e w general features t h a t serve t o identify what w e mean by creative research, as opposed t o t h e pedestrian. Our advice to anyone contemplating creative research is to:
Avoid t h e research literature. Avoid practitioner's problems. Never put high hopes on any study for any useful information.
Never plan -especially not in t h e long term.
Never apply for a research grant. Never give up if everyone thinks you a r e wrong. Give up immediately when t h e y think you a r e right.
As Nietzsche said, "that which needs t o be proved cannot b e worth much", so in today's world I won't hold my breath waiting for any putative "research" organizations to adopt even one of t h e foregoing principles as p a r t of t h e i r official posture and manifesto. Nonetheless, t h e closer an individual r e s e a r c h e r comes to adherence to these guidelines, t h e closer h e o r she will be t o a position from which to c r a c k t h e nut of system complexity and its management.
Notes and references

Complexity and simplicity
A detailed consideration of the contention that system complexity necessarily relates to the interaction of a given system with its observer/describer/controller is found in Phillips. W. and Thorson, S . (1975) Complexity and policy planning, in Systems Thinking and the Quality of Life, Proc. Soc. for General Systems Research Annual Meeting. This paper is notable for its review of various concepts of complexity in the field of social system management and for its conclusion that " ... no adequate characterization of the complexity of a system can be given without specifying the class of observers dealing with the system, as well as the specific purposes of the observers". The author's arguments supporting this view of complexity culminate in the contention that "whichever approach we take to modeling the outer environment -the policy problem -the complexity c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e system is contingent upon o u r description of t h e relations between t h e inner environment and t h e o u t e r . It is a function of t h e t h e o r i e s w e bring t o b e a r upon problems and t h e way we view t h e environment".
Some f u r t h e r views along t h e same lines were e x p r e s s e d by one of t h e cybernetics pioneers, W. Ross Ashby, in Ashby, W.R. (19'73) Some peculiarities of complex systems. Cybernetics Medicine 9: 1-8.
In t h i s p a p e r , Ashby remarked t h a t "a system's complexity i s purely r e l a t i v e t o a given o b s e r v e r ; I r e j e c t t h e attempt t o measure a n absolute, o r intrinsic, complexity; but this acceptance of complexity as something in t h e e y e of t h e beholder is, in my opinion, t h e only workable way of measuring complexity".
Basically, t h e same points have been emphasized in t h e philosophy of science l i t e r a t u r e from a somewhat more fundamental perspective; see , 
Management of the complez
The concepts of design and control complexity were introduced by Gottinger in t h e somewhat different context of a n automata-theoretic treatment of complexity. For a r e c e n t account of his ideas see Gottinger, H. (1983) Coping w i t h Complezity (Dordrecht: Reidel).
This work r e p r e s e n t s a n a p p r o a c h t o t h e problem of system complexity originally initiated by John Rhodes in Rhodes, J . (1971) Application of Automata l'heory a n d ALgebra (Berkeley, CA: Lecture Notes, Department of Mathematics, University of California).
The importance of t h e symmetry of t h e interaction between t h e system and i t s o b s e r v e r / c o n t r o l l e r h a s been particularly emphasized in For a discussion of some of t h e important matters arising from t h e interactions p r e s e n t in t h e political p r o c e s s see as well as t h e Phillips a n d Thorson a r t i c l e cited e a r l i e r . s t e m s , o b s e r v a b l e s , a n d m o d e l s A thorough exposition of t h e ideas surrounding observables, abstractions, and equations of state is found in t h e Rosen books cited e a r l i e r .
S y
The fast-slow distinction as a means of inducing causality i s a special case of h i e r a r c h i c a l ordering, but in time r a t h e r than space. For a discussion of this c r u c i a l point. see t h e book Use of a n evolutionary metaphor t o c h a r a c t e r i z e human systems is f a r from new, dating back at least t o H e r b e r t S p e n c e r and t h e social Darwinists. A modern attempt t o mimic biology as a guide t o social development is The connection between t h e s e mathematical r e s u l t s and t h e t h e o r y of equivalent systems i s made in F o r a discussion of the interrelationship between t h e idea of system complexity as presented h e r e , and t h e concepts of system e r r o r and entropy, s e e Chapter 5 in Rosen (1978) , cited e a r l i e r .
Many attempts have been made to define t h e complexity of a system in terms of prop e r t i e s of t h e system alone, such as number of components, density of internal
